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land General Assembly used this same
principle in establishing the statutory
right to a jury trial under section 4302(e)(2)(i).
In addition, because one of the
criminal violations was dismissed by
the district court after a jury trial was
demanded by the corporate defendants,
the court ofappeals clarified the effect
of the dismissal on the right to a jury
trial. Id. at 467 n. 6, 610 A.2d at 768 n.
6. The court noted that it considered
the offenses charged at the time ofthe
demand for a jury trial. Id. As long as
the defendant was entitled to a jury trial
at the time ofthe demand, a subsequent
dismissal or nol pros of one of the
charged offenses has no effect on the
right to a jury trial. Id. (citing State v.
Huebner, 305 Md. 601, 606-07, 505
A.2d 1331, 1334 (1986)).
In 3011 Corp. v. District Court,
the court of appeals established that a
corporation has the same statutory right
to a jury trial as an individual charged
with the same criminal offense if the
offense carries a prison sentence in
excess of90 days. In placing its focus
on the statutory penalty, and not the
penalty applicable to the particular
defendant in a case, the court of appeals reaffirmed the fundamental nature of the right to jury trial and the
principle that, although not subject to
imprisonment, corporations are treated
like individuals under the law.
- Kenneth A. Brown
Lee v. Weisman: COURT HOLDS
NON-SECT ARIAN PRAYER AT
SECONDARY SCHOOL GRADUATION CEREMONY VIOLATES
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO
THE CONSTITUTION.
InLeev. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649
(1992), the United States Supreme
Court held that offering invocation and
benediction prayers as part ofthe formal graduation ceremonies for secondary schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution. Inso
holding, the Court declined to recon-

sider the three-part Establishment
Clause test set forth in Lemon lI.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
In lune 1989, Deborah Weisman
graduated from Nathan Bishop Middle
School, a public school in Providence,
Rhode Island The school principal
invited a rabbi to deliver prayers in
conjunction with the graduation exercises for the class. The principal provided the speaker with a pamphlet entitled ''Guidelines for Civic Occasions,"
prepared by the National Conference
of Christians andlews. This pamphlet
advised members of the clergy performing the prayers that the invocation
and benediction should be non-sectarian. In this case, the invocation and
benediction were non-sectarian, however, they did contained references to
God.
Prior to Deborah's graduation ceremony, Deborah's father, Daniel
Weisman, in his individual capacity as
a taxpayer and as next friend of
Deborah, sought a temporary restraining order in the United District Court
for the District of Rhode Island.
Weisman sought to prohibit the school
officials from including the prayers in
the graduation ceremony. The court
denied the motion and her family eventually attended the graduation where
the prayers were recited
Thereafter, the case was submitted
to the District Court on stipulated facts.
The court held that the practice of
utilizing prayers in the context of public school graduations violated the
three-part Establishment Clause test
enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971). Under the Lemon
test, in order ''to satisfy the Establishment Clause, a governmental practice
must (1) reflect a clearly secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and (3) avoid excessive government
entanglement with religion." Weisman,
112 S. Ct. at 2654 (citing Committee
for Public Education & Religious Liberty lI. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773
(1973)). Applying this test, the district
court enjoined the Providence School

Committee from continuing to employ
Id. Specifically, the
school district violated the second prong
ofthe Lemon test by creating an atmosphere in which the state identified
with a religion. Id.
The school officials appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit which agreed with the
holding and rationale of the district
court. Id. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to address the
issue ofwhether the use of invocations
and benedictions at a public school
graduation violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to the
Constitution.
The Court began its analysis by
emphasizing that even though attendance at public school graduation is
voluntary, "attendance and participation [which may include] state-sponsored religious activity are in a 1hlr and
real sense obligatory ..." Id. at 2655.
The Court explicitly refused the invitation to reconsider its decision inLemon,
because the government involvement
with the invocation and benediction at
the public school graduation was ''pervasive, to the point of creating a statesponsored and state directed religious
exercise in a public schooL" Id. The
Court noted that the school principal's
involvement with the composition of
the prayers and the choice ofa rabbi to
perform the prayers was akin to the
State deciding by statute that an invocation and benediction should be given.
Id. at 2655. Along similar lines, the
court reasoned that by providing the
rabbi with a copy ofthe Guidelines for
Civic Occasions, the principal ostensibly "directed and controlled the content of the prayer." Id. at 2656. The
Court asserted that it was inappropriate for government to compose or provide official prayers for recitation at an
event in part sponsored by the government. Id. at 2656 (citing Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,425 (1962)).
The Court next turned its analysis
to the issue ofcoercive pressure among
students in elementary and secondary
public schools and the n~ to protect
this practice.
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''their freedom of conscience." Id at
2658 (citing Abington School District
v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963)
(Goldberg, J., concurring». Apparently, the Court feared that non-believers could construe the graduation
prayers to signify the school's, and
consequently the State's, endorsement
of "a religious orthodoxy." Id. The
Court noted that prayer exercised in
public schools carried the risk of indirect coercion. Id
Finally, the Court distinguished
its decision in Marsh v. Chambers. 463
U.S. 783 (1983), where it upheld the
constitutionality of the Nebraska
legislature's practice of opening each
of its legislative sessions with a prayer
offered by a chaplain who was paid
with public funds. The Court noted
that inherent differences exist between
the public schools and state legislatures. Id. Namely, the legislative
session pertained to adults who were
free to enter and leave, whereas a high
school graduation involves young students who may feel pressure to conform. Id. at 2660-61.
In dissent, Justice Scalia emphasized that ''the Establishment Clause
must be construed in light of the 'governmental policies ofaccommodation,
acknowledgement, and support for religion [that] are an accepted part ofour
political and cultural heritage. '" Id. at
2678 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia
believed the majority's opinion ignored
the long standing traditions of benedictions and invocations at public
school graduations. Id. at 2679. He
opined that the Court had created a
psychological coercion test capable of
being manipulated. Id. at 2679. In
essence, Scalia chided the majority for
replacing the Lemon test with a psychocoercion test which has no roots or
traditions in the American system. Id.
at 2685
In Weisman. the Court declared
the practice ofclergy performing invocations and benedictions at public
school graduations unconstitutional
within the meaning of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
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The Court's opinion reinforced its commitment to protect public school children from the possibility of religious
coercion by the State. Moreover, the
decision sends the message that the
Court will not tolerate even the slightest government endorsement of any
religion where young adults or children
are involved.
- David E. Canter

Medical WIlSIe Assoc. v. Maryland
WIlSIe Coalition: MARYLAND ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING ACT
DOES NOT APPLY TO AN ORGANIZATION THAT SEEKS JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE.
In Medical Waste Assoc. v. Maryland Waste Coalition, 327 Md. 596,
612 A.2d 241 (1992), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland had its first opportunity to interpret the Maryland
Environmental Standing Act
("MESA"). The court held that MESA
does not grant environmental groups
standing to participate in judicial review of administrative decisions. The
court, however, did hold that the decision to issue a permit for a medical
waste incinerator was subject to judicial review.
Maryland Waste Coalition ("Coalition") is an incorporated volunteer organization whose purpose is to protect
Maryland's environment. The Coalition objected to a refuse disposal permit
and an air quality control permit authorizing construction ofa medical waste
incinerator which were issued to Medical Waste Associates by the Maryland
Department of the Environment. Public hearings were held regarding the
permits, at which the Coalition testifled.
After the permits were issued, the
Coalition filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against
Medical Waste Associates and the Department of the Environment seeking
an injunction under section 9-263 ofthe
Environment Article. Section 9-263
states that an action may be commenced
by "any county, municipality. . .

institution, or person" for judicial review ofany "order, rule or regulation"
issued by the Secretary of the Department of the Environment. Medical
WasteAssoc., 327 Md. at 599 n.l, 612
A.2d at 243 n.l (citing Md Envir.
Code Ann § 9-263 (1991 Cum.Supp.».
Medical Waste Associates and the Department ofthe Environment both filed
motions to dismiss. They contended
that the Coalition lacked subject matter jurisdiction because there was no
"order" for section 9-263 review, and
lacked standing because the Coalition
had no interest separate and distinct
from its members. TheCoaiitionfiled
another complaint against the Department of the Environment, under the
. Administrative Procedure Act in the
State Government Article, section 10215, Maryland Code Annotated.
("APA"). Under the APA, a "party
who is aggrieved by a final decision in
a contested case is entitled to judicial
review ofthe decision." Medical Waste
Assoc., 327 Md. at 608,612 A.2d at
247. Medical Waste Associates filed
a motion to intervene and, along with
the Department of the Environment,
filed a motion to dismiss. The defendants contended that the administIative proceedings prior to the issuance
of the two permits were legislative,
and thus were not contested cases under the APA.
The circuit court granted the motions to dismiss and the Coalition appealed both decisions to the Court of
Special Appeals ofMaryland. Inaddition to its previous arguments, the
Coalition invoked MESA as an indication ofthe General Assembly's intent to give standing to groups raising
environmental issues. The case was
remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for further proceedings on
the action for judicial review under
MESA.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted the petitions and cross petitions for certiorari, to review whether
the issuance of permits was subject to
judicial review under either section 9263 or the AP A, and whether the Coa-

